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Abstract. The abstraction of cryptographic operations by term algebras, called
Dolev-Yao models, is essential in almost all tool-supported methods for prov-
ing security protocols. Recently significant progress was made in proving that
Dolev-Yao models can be sound with respect to actual cryptographic realizations
and security definitions. The strongest results show this in the sense of blackbox
reactive simulatability (BRSIM)/UC, a notion that essentially means the preserva-
tion of arbitrary security properties under arbitrary active attacks and in arbitrary
protocol environments, with only small changes to the Dolev-Yao models and
natural implementations.
However, these results are so far restricted to core cryptographic systems like
encryption and signatures. Typical modern tools and complexity results around
Dolev-Yao models also allow operations with more algebraic properties, in par-
ticular XOR because of its clear structure and cryptographic usefulness. We show
that it is not possible to extend the strong BRSIM/UC results to XOR, at least not
with remotely the same generality and naturalness as for the core cryptographic
systems. We also show that for every potential soundness result for XOR with se-
crecy implications, one significant change to typical Dolev-Yao models must be
made. On the positive side, we show the soundness of a rather general Dolev-Yao
model with XOR and its realization in the sense of BRSIM/UC under passive
attacks.
1 Introduction
Tool-supported verification of cryptographic protocols almost always relies on abstrac-
tions of cryptographic operations by term algebras with cancellation rules, called Dolev-
Yao models after the first authors [2]. An example term is Dske(Epke(Epke(m))), where
E and D denote public-key encryption and decryption, ske and pke a corresponding
secret and public encryption key, and m a payload message. By payloads we denote
the type of non-cryptographic data that most Dolev-Yao models have. It is used for data
input by the users of the Dolev-Yao model, e.g., emails to be encrypted and signed or
payment data constructed by a payment protocol using the Dolev-Yao model. We wrote
the keys as indices for readability; formally they are normal operands in the term. A
typical cancellation rule is Dske(Epke(t)) = t for all corresponding keys and terms t,
⋆ A preliminary version of this paper appeared in [1].
thus the above term is equivalent to Epke(m). The proof tools handle these terms sym-
bolically, i.e., they never evaluate them to bitstrings. In other words, the tools perform
abstract algebraic manipulations on trees consisting of operators and base messages, us-
ing only the cancellation rules, the message-construction rules of a particular protocol,
and abstract models of networks and adversaries. The core of these term algebras are
operations like encryption and decryption which ideally have very few algebraic prop-
erties; essentially there are only constructors and destructors. However, if one wants to
benefit from such abstractions in protocols that also contain operations with more alge-
braic properties, those operations have to be given a similar specification so that they fit
into the overall term algebra. A typical such operation is the exclusive or (XOR), see,
e.g., [3–5], because it is commutative and associative and has significant uses in cryp-
tology, e.g., as the one-time pad, in modes of operation of block ciphers, and in some
protocols.
1.1 Dolev-Yao Soundness and XOR
It is not at all clear from the outset whether Dolev-Yao models are a sound abstrac-
tion from real cryptography with its computational security definitions. In particular,
the tools assume that only the modeled operations and cancellation rules are possible
manipulations on terms, and that terms that cannot be constructed with these rules are
completely secret. For instance, if an adversary (also called intruder) only saw the ex-
ample term above and only the mentioned cancellation rule was given, then m would
be considered secret. In term-algebra terminology, this corresponds to considering only
the initial model of the given equational specification. While it is usually clear that real
cryptography is some model of the specification, it is not clear that it is exactly the ini-
tial model. For instance, if arbitrarily long payloads m are allowed, real cryptography
cannot prevent that the term above leaks information about the length ofm. Hence there
is already a soundness problem.
Recent work has essentially bridged this long-standing gap between Dolev-Yao
models and real cryptographic definitions: It was shown that an almost normal Dolev-
Yao model of several important cryptographic system types can be implemented with
real cryptographic systems secure according to standard cryptographic definitions in a
way that offers blackbox reactive simulatability (BRSIM) [6]. This security (or sound-
ness) notion essentially means that one system, here the cryptographic realization, can
be plugged into arbitrary protocols instead of another system, here the Dolev-Yao
model, without any noticeable difference [7–9]. Essentially the same notion is also
called UC for its universal composition properties [10].1 This BRSIM/UC result was
extended to more cryptographic primitives [11–13] and used in protocol proofs [14–
19]. Moreover, tailored tool support for this library was subsequently added [20, 21].
General theorems on property preservation through the BRSIM notion imply that the
same Dolev-Yao model and realization also fulfill some other soundness notions [7,
22–24, 22, 25, 26], and further soundness results specific to this Dolev-Yao model and
1 The 2005 revision of the long version of [10] also contains an explicit blackbox version of
UC, which is proven to be equivalent to UC. A similar equivalence was first shown in the long
version of [7] for universal and blackbox synchronous reactive simulatability.
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realization were proved in [27]. Stronger links of this Dolev-Yao model to conventional
Dolev-Yao type systems were provided in [28], and an integration into the Isabelle the-
orem prover in [29]. Earlier soundness results considered passive attacks only [30–32].
Later papers such as [33–35] define weaker soundness notions, such as integrity only or
offline mappings between runs of the two systems, and/or allow less general protocol
classes, e.g., only a specific class of key exchange protocols. For these cases, they can
use simpler Dolev-Yao models and/or realizations than [6]. Since computational sound-
ness has become a highly active line of research, we exemplarily list further recent
results in this area without going into further details [36–38, 21, 39].
All these Dolev-Yao soundness papers consider only core cryptographic systems
like encryption and signatures, not operations with additional algebraic properties like
XOR. The first sound formal abstraction of XOR was presented in [40, 41] in a calculus
for pseudorandomness that can replace more standard Dolev-Yao calculi if encryptions
(e.g., block ciphers) are treated as cryptographic pseudorandom permutations. It only
treats passive attacks.
In this paper we first show that one change to Dolev-Yao models of XOR is neces-
sary to obtain any soundness result that implies secrecy: the adversary must be allowed
to parse XORs unless one component is uniformly random; we call this the XOR-
parsing need. Types that are not uniformly random are payloads, but also keys and
ciphertexts for standard cryptographic realizations. Then we study whether the sound-
ness results in the sense of BRSIM/UC can be extended to Dolev-Yao models with
XOR. It turns out that this is impossible in a general way. We are quite surprised by this
result, because XOR seems a simple operation compared with systems like digital sig-
natures, and it seems well described by its algebraic properties. We have also not found
reasonable restrictions to the protocol class considered, or reasonable modifications to
the Dolev-Yao model or the realization of XOR that would make a BRSIM/UC result
possible. The precise range of Dolev-Yao models, protocol classes, and realizations,
for which we show such BRSIM/UC impossibility results is discussed in more detail
below. The only positive result we show is restricted to passive attacks. Otherwise this
result is strong: It shows soundness in the sense of BRSIM/UC, allows a broad range
of other operations in the Dolev-Yao model, and correctly handles situations where
some components in an XOR are uniformly random and others are not. We call it pas-
sive BRSIM/UC XOR soundness. Although early papers on bridging the gap between
Dolev-Yao models and cryptography were also for passive attacks only, typical overall
Dolev-Yao attackers are active, and indeed most security protocols are intended for sce-
narios with wide-ranging active attacks. We therefore consider our negative results for
the active case more important.2
A considerable technical problem in the BRSIM/UC impossibility results is that we
would like to show that no Dolev-Yao model with XOR has any realization sound in the
sense of BRSIM/UC. However, this is a meta-theorem formulation: There is no current
2 Another soundness result for XOR in the passive case was recently obtained in [42]. Here XOR
is restricted to terms whose corresponding bitstrings have a uniformly random distribution.
Thus, e.g., one cannot even model a one-time pad combining a random string and an arbitrary
plaintext. Moreover, we recently showed a similar results for Dolev-Yao style representations
of hash functions [43].
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definition of a Dolev-Yao model independent of specific system models such as CSP,
pi-calculus, I/O automata etc. For positive results, this is not a problem. However, an
impossibility result that only holds for one such model would not be very convincing.
(In particular, the closest model to build on would be the BPW-DY model from [6],
because it already avoids “smaller” impossibilities for BRSIM/UC soundness; how-
ever, due to syntax idiosyncrasies many people find it hard to transfer basic ideas from
that model to others. An equivalent less idiosyncratic version was published too late
to influence the present results [29].) Not even the notion of an XOR realization is
completely well-defined, e.g., if one considers adding XOR to a Dolev-Yao realization
where other operators are type-tagged. Hence, instead of proving impossibility for one
specific Dolev-Yao model, we will only make certain assumptions on the Dolev-Yao
model; we believe they are fulfilled by all such models existing so far.
Clearly, the BRSIM/UC impossibility results that we show for Dolev-Yao models
with XOR leave room for considering weaker notions of soundness. It is also not ex-
cluded that even a BRSIM/UC soundness result holds for certain restricted protocol
classes to which none of our impossibility results applies. Furthermore, certain proto-
cols built with XORs may be secure with respect to certain specifications (ideal sys-
tems) in the sense of BRSIM/UC even when the underlying cryptographic operations
altogether cannot be abstracted by a BRSIM/UC-sound Dolev-Yao model. It will be
interesting to investigate the precise limits in the future. Nevertheless, these results
show that the general secure pluggability of a cryptographic realization for a Dolev-
Yao model given by the BRSIM/UC results for core cryptographic operations cannot
be extended to XOR.
1.2 Further Related Work
The XOR operation has accompanied cryptography from its beginnings, from simple
ciphers in ancient and medieval times, over the one-time pad and the work of Shannon,
to its widespread use in modern cryptography where it constitutes an essential compo-
nent in many cryptographic protocols, e.g., [44–46]. To the best of our knowledge, the
XOR operation in the symbolic analysis of cryptographic protocols was first mentioned
by Meadows as a possible extension of the NRL analyzer [47]. It has been incorpo-
rated into many formal proof tools, e.g., NRL [48], CAPSL [49], Isabelle [50], and
OFMC [51]. Recent papers on XOR in Dolev-Yao models mainly investigate the decid-
ability and complexity of the security of certain protocol classes against a Dolev-Yao
attack in the presence of deduction rules for the XOR operator [4, 5].
The line of work on Dolev-Yao models with XOR typically continues with ab-
stractions of more general Abelian groups, e.g., [52–54], and the exponentiation func-
tion as used in many cryptographic systems based on the discrete-logarithm problem,
e.g., [55–57]. While we have not yet considered the soundness of these extensions, we
are convinced that a general use of such operations on other terms would lead to similar
problems as with XOR. For exponentiations, however, it may be more realistic than for
XOR to make strong restrictions on the types of terms that can be exponentiated and
the use of the results within larger terms, and such restrictions might help.
Reactive simulatability (RSIM) could, in terms of the semantics community, be
called an implementation or refinement relation, with a particular emphasis on also re-
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taining secrecy properties, in contrast to typical implementation relations. It was first
defined generally in [7], based on simulatability definitions for secure (one-step) func-
tion evaluation [58–62]. On the side of formal methods, it is also highly related to the
observational equivalence notions for a probabilisticpi-calculus from [63]. Reactive def-
initions of simulatability for asynchronous systems were presented in [8, 10], called UC
(universal composability) and with somewhat different details in the latter. Since then,
these definitions have been used in many ways for proving individual cryptographic
systems and general theorems. While the definitions of [8, 10] have not been rigorously
mapped, we believe that for the results in this paper the differences do not matter, in
particular if one thinks of the equivalent blackbox version of UC. Similarly, we believe
that the results would hold in the formalism started in [63].
In the wider field of linking formal methods and cryptography, there is also work
on formulating syntactic calculi for dealing with probabilism and polynomial-time con-
siderations directly and encoding them into proof tools, in particular [64–68]. This is
orthogonal to the work of justifying Dolev-Yao models: In situations where Dolev-Yao
models are applicable and sound, they are likely to remain important because of the
strong simplification they offer to the tools, which enables the tools to treat larger over-
all systems automatically than with the more detailed models of cryptography.
1.3 More Details on Our Results
We now summarize our results in a bit more detail.
XOR-parsing need. In Section 2, we show that the standard Dolev-Yao model of XOR
used in the literature is not sound with respect to every moderately natural implemen-
tation if secrecy is required (not necessarily BRSIM/UC) and arbitrary terms such as
payloads can be XORed. Instead, the adversary must be allowed to parse XORs unless
one component is uniformly random. In realizations based only upon standard crypto-
graphic security definitions, the only sufficiently random types are nonces, i.e., explic-
itly generated fresh random or pseudorandom strings, while payloads, keys, ciphertexts,
and signatures are not automatically sufficiently random. However, in restricted situa-
tions more random types may be possible, e.g., if the payload distribution is known and
strong compression is used, or if one restricts symmetric encryption or authentication
schemes to those with uniformly random keys. While this result is not very surprising
from the cryptographic point of view, the consequences such as special operators for
the adversary would already be significant changes in some Dolev-Yao models in the
literature.
BRSIM/UC impossibility results. Our major results are negative results that aim at
demonstrating the informal claim that it is not possible to realize “true Dolev-Yao mod-
els” by “real XORs” in a generally composable way. In the following, we summarize
our concrete impossibility results.
– If we assume a Dolev-Yao model with XOR and payloads and a realization where
payloads are arbitrary bitstrings and used in their original form, and if we postulate
that the Dolev-Yao model treats XORs of payloads in a certain natural way, then it is
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not sound in the sense of BRSIM/UC. This is sketched in Section 4.1 and rigorously
shown in Section 6.1. We only need XORs of two payloads and the protocol could
be fixed and generally known. Hence this is a rather strong result. We also discuss
why one might nevertheless not be satisfied with the “certain natural way”, and thus
be interested in the later results also (Section 4.2).
– If we assume a Dolev-Yao model with XOR and signatures, and a realization where
payloads are arbitrary and used in their original form, then soundness in the sense
of BRSIM/UC implies that the Dolev-Yao model can compute actual signatures ac-
cording to the real algorithms used in the assumed cryptographic realization. Infor-
mally this contradicts the assumption that the given system is a Dolev-Yao model.
More precisely, we present a reduction proof showing that under the given assump-
tions, the (supposed) Dolev-Yao model can be used to build a signing algorithm
with minimal additional operations. This is sketched in Section 4.3 and rigorously
shown in Section 6.2.
– The same result holds even if the payloads may be encoded in the real system before
being used in XORs, but with low or well-structured redundancy such as type tags
(Section 7.1). To the best of our knowledge, all current implementations of XOR
fall into this class or the previous class.
– The same result holds with more complex counterexamples if we no longer assume
that arbitrary usage of the Dolev-Yao model is allowed, but only assume that certain
useful-looking protocols can be built on top of it. For our main counterexample
in this case we additionally assume that public-key encryption with the standard
secrecy features is available in the Dolev-Yao model (Section 7.2).
– Even if there are no payloads at all, a similar result holds where the system that
should be a Dolev-Yao model must at least be able to test signatures. I.e., we now
make a reduction proof that yields an approximate test algorithm, a notion that we
first define rigorously (Section 7.3).
The basic underlying problem in all these cases is when an honest participant receives
an XOR from an active adversary, and the simulator of the BRSIM/UC definition cannot
know how to parse it, and will thus either parse it wrong with high probability, or leave
real work to the supposed Dolev-Yao model.
Positive BRSIM/UC result for passive attacks. In Section 8, we show BRSIM/UC
soundness for an extension of the Dolev-Yao model from [6] and its realization, where
both restrict the adversary to passive attacks. The adversary capabilities in the Dolev-
Yao model are extended compared with standard models as necessary according to the
result on XOR-parsing need. Additionally, we need a restriction that the users, i.e.,
typically the protocols that use the Dolev-Yao systems, only request correct type con-
versions from XORs back to underlying term types. The condition is of a class that can
be verified formally for the protocols. A third slightly unusual feature, but natural in the
context, is that we allow nonce types of different lengths, so that the corresponding real
nonces can be used to hide terms of arbitrary length.
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2 The Need for Special XOR Parsing by the Dolev-Yao Adversary
We first show why every XOR abstraction that is sound with respect to secrecy, i.e.,
messages that are symbolically secret in the Dolev-Yao model are also cryptographi-
cally secret in the realization, must be different from the standard Dolev-Yao XOR in the
literature. Thus this negative result is broader than only for the strong BRSIM/UC no-
tion of soundness. However, it only concerns the standard Dolev-Yao models of XOR,
and can be circumvented by adding a feature to these Dolev-Yao models which we con-
sider well within the spirit of Dolev-Yao models. Thus we do not call it an impossibility
result. In particular, our passively sound model in Section 8 has this additional feature.
As far as we know, all Dolev-Yao models with XOR that are used in tools or in
decidability and complexity results allow participants to XOR arbitrary terms and to
convert (typically implicitly) a result that is a term of another type back to that type. For
instance, a recipient who receives a one-time pad ciphertext c = XOR(d, k), where d is
a plaintext and k a key, may ask to have c XORed with k and to obtain the plaintext d
as output. The adversary has no additional capabilities in these models. For instance, if
it receives an XOR of two terms that it both doesn’t know, and that both did not occur
in other XORs, it cannot derive these terms. For instance, an adversary not knowing k
and d in the example above cannot retrieve k or d.
Now assume that an honest participant XORs two plaintexts written in English and
sends the result to the adversary. The result can be cryptanalyzed if the texts are long
enough, i.e., a real adversary can retrieve the two plaintexts, e.g., see the section on
running-key ciphers in [69]. Hence we must model that an XOR leaks the underlying
terms to the adversary unless we know that at least one of these terms is sufficiently
random. In this sense, prior Dolev-Yao models of XOR are overly optimistic. (The
pseudorandomness calculus from [40] of course recognizes that XORs are only pseu-
dorandom if at least one contained term is.) Even data types of significant entropy, like
secret or public keys of public-key systems, are not sufficiently uniformly distributed
given only the standard cryptographic definitions to guarantee that an XOR with them
hides plaintext data or other cryptographic elements well, i.e., besides the entropy they
may contain significant redundancy.
One can deal with this imperfection—and we will do so in detail in the positive
result for passive attacks—by distinguishing a set of random types among the types of
a Dolev-Yao model. Elements of a random type are deemed sufficiently random (often
pseudo-random in reality) to restrict the adversary to the standard algebraic operations
on XORs. However, if there are no unknown random elements in an XOR, the Dolev-
Yao adversary is given the capability to parse this XOR, i.e., if he learns the XOR, then
he also learns the XORed terms.
3 Blackbox Reactive Simulatability
Our remaining positive and negative results about the soundness of Dolev-Yao mod-
els with XOR concern the soundness notion of blackbox reactive simulatability (BR-
SIM)/UC. Hence we start by surveying this notion. Reactive simulatability is a general
notion for comparing two systems, typically called real and ideal system. In terms of the
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semantics community one might call RSIM an implementation or refinement relation,
specifically geared towards the preservation of what one might call secrecy properties
compared with functional properties. We believe that all our following results are inde-
pendent of the small differences between the definition styles of [63, 7, 10], and there-
fore write “BRSIM/UC”. However, we have to use a specific formalism for the actual
results, and we use that from [8]. Here one speaks of ideal and real systems (the func-
tionalities and protocols of UC). The ideal system is often called TH for “trusted host”,
see Figure 1, and the protocol machines of the real system are often called Mu, where u
is a user index. The ideal or real system interacts with arbitrary so-called honest users,
often collectively denoted by a machine H; this corresponds to potential protocols or
human users to whom the functionality is offered. Furthermore, the ideal or real system
interacts with an adversary, who is often given more power than the honest users; in par-
ticular in real systems A typically controls the network and can manipulate messages
on the bitstring level. Adversaries are often denoted by A. They are allowed to interact
directly with H; this corresponds to known-message and chosen-message attacks.
Reactive simulatability between the real and ideal system essentially means that for
every attack on the real system there exists an equivalent attack on the ideal system.
More specifically, blackbox reactive simulatability (BRSIM) states that there exists a
simulator Sim that can use an arbitrary real adversary A as a blackbox, such that arbi-
trary honest users H cannot distinguish whether they interact with the real system and
the real adversary, or with the ideal system and the simulator with its blackbox. Indistin-
guishability of families of random variables, here applied to the two families of views
of the honest users, is a well-known cryptographic notion from [70]. As Sim is chosen
before A and H, the BRSIM definition allows A and H that communicate directly. Our
first counterexample, however, will not make use of this feature.
A
H
M
1
M
n
H
TH
ASim
...
1.
2.
3.
Fig. 1. Overview of blackbox reactive simulatability (BRSIM). A real system is on the left; an
ideal system plus simulator on the right. The views of H must be indistinguishable. The quantifiers
are numbered to show their order.
The reader may regard the machines, i.e., the individual boxes in Figure 1, as (pos-
sibly probabilistic) I/O automata, Turing machines, CSP or pi-calculus processes etc.
The only requirement on the underlying system model is that the notion of an execution
of a system when run together with an honest user and an adversary is well-defined.
In [8], the machines are a type of probabilistic I/O automata. We always assume that all
parties are polynomial-time.
8
In the following, the ideal system TH will always be a Dolev-Yao model with XOR
and the real system its distributed realization with bitstring XORs. The question is
whether the BRSIM relation can be fulfilled between such systems.
4 Main Scenarios for BRSIM/UC Impossibility Results
In this section, we informally describe two scenarios that demonstrate the impossibility
of BRSIM/UC soundness for Dolev-Yao models with XOR. We start with a simple
scenario, then discuss the assumptions about the Dolev-Yao model and its realization
needed in this scenario, and then provide a more complex scenario that needs weaker
assumptions. In Section 5 we make the assumptions more precise. In Section 6 we prove
the impossilibity of these scenarios with the precise assumptions, and in Section 7 we
sketch further scenario extensions to broaden the impossibility results. Readers with a
specific Dolev-Yao model in mind should be able to see already in the current section
how the scenarios would be expressed in that model, and thus how the impossibility
results apply there.
4.1 Scenario with Payload XOR
We first study the scenario in Figure 2. In all our interaction figures, we show a real
scenario on the left and an attempted simulation on the right. We write Hu for the actual
user with index u, which is a part of the global H in Figure 1.
xr xr := m
1
r m
2
r
mr = m
2
r
M
u
AH
u
TH AH
u
Sim
xu xu xa =
XOR(?, ?)
XOR(xu, m
1
r) mr :=
xr m
1
r
xr
(m
1
r, m
2
r)
xr := m
1
r m
2
r
?
XOR(xu, m
1
r)
(m
1
r, m
2
r) (m
1
r, m
2
r) (m
1
r, m
2
r)
Fig. 2. Scenario with payload XOR.
In this scenario, the adversary and the honest user are parametrized with two pay-
loads mr1 and mr2. The superscript r denotes that these are real bitstrings, not abstract
terms; we write terms without superscript. The real adversary XORs these two bitstrings
and sends the result xr to the machine Mu, which notifies its user Hu that a message
was received, and possibly that it is an XOR. We write the representations of terms/real
messages to user Hu with a superscript u; we discuss this below. The user Hu now asks
its machine Mu to XOR the received message with the payload mr1 and to output the
resulting payload. Hence Hu obtains mr2.
When the simulator Sim tries to simulate this with the ideal system TH, i.e., with the
Dolev-Yao model, it also obtains the real XOR xr from the real adversary, and it is sup-
posed to send a corresponding XOR term using the Dolev-Yao model; we denote this
by xa. (The a means that this is the ideal adversary’s representation of the term.) How-
ever, at this moment there are many possibilities of what mr1 and mr2 could be, even if
the simulator knows that this is an XOR of precisely two payloads. Hence if Sim has to
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select some, with overwhelming probability it will select another pair mr3 and mr4 with
mr3 ⊕m
r
4 = x
r
. Now TH, like Mu, notifies user Hu that a message was received, and
possibly that it is an XOR. In our scenario, Hu asks TH to XOR the received message
with the payloadmr1 and to output the resulting payload. If TH acts purely symbolically
on the term XOR(m3,m4), it obtains XOR(m3,m4,m1). For indistinguishability be-
tween the real and ideal system, the actual output should, however, be mr2. This clearly
requires that TH evaluates the real, non-algebraic XOR on the bitstrings corresponding
to the payload terms m3, m4, and m1. This is not what a standard Dolev-Yao model
would do.
If the simulator, instead of inputting the term x as the XOR of two guessed payloads,
can input it as an “unknown XOR”, as indicated by the question marks in Figure 2, the
simulation fails even more clearly: Now TH has no information at all that the XOR of
the terms x and m1 is equivalent to m2.
4.2 Discussion of the Scenario with Payload XOR
First note that the scenario with payload XOR in Section 4.1 is valid even if the “pro-
tocol” used on top of the Dolev-Yao model is fixed and known to the simulator: The
protocol in this case is simply that Hu knows two payloads (or the protocol machine
Hu accepts them from a “real user” H′u, who in turn knows them from somewhere),
receives a message from the adversary, XORs it with one of the payloads and tests that
the result is the other payload. The knowledge of this does not help Sim above.
Secondly, we assumed that payloads can be random bitstrings and are used without
additional redundancy in real XORs. Very strong redundancy might allow Sim to parse
xr uniquely into the two payloadsmr1 and mr2. However, this would be a highly unusual
class or encoding of payloads. As long as there exist four different payloads such that,
in their encoding before the application of XOR, we have mr1 ⊕mr2 = mr3 ⊕mr4, the
scenario is still a valid counterexample because the simulator will still be wrong with
significant probability, unless we allow the simulator to input a term representation xa
that contains all possible parsings, and assume it is feasible to find them.
Finally, the relation between real payloads and payload terms needs a discussion.
In typical Dolev-Yao models, different payloads are a priori abstracted to atoms of the
term algebra, e.g., two emails mr1 and mr2 become two atoms m1 and m2. When we
plug such a Dolev-Yao model into an overall real system, where payloads may have
complex application semantics so that we cannot simply make them atoms, we therefore
assume that the full ideal functionalityTH maintains a translation table between the real
payloads that occur in a system execution and the corresponding Dolev-Yao terms. This
is why we wrote the user inputs and outputs as mr1 and mr2. If they were just atoms m1
andm2, the impossibility in the scenario above would be even clearer: Either Sim would
not even have the atoms m1 and m2, or with probability at least one half it would select
a wrong pair (m3,m4) of atoms, and then a later derivation that XOR(m3,m4,m1)
equals m2 is impossible.
When considering soundness in the sense of BRSIM/UC, we have an even stronger
motivation for also considering real payloads even if the core Dolev-Yao model ab-
stracts from them: In the realization, the real payload bitstrings from the users are en-
crypted, XORed, etc. Hence they must be input and output. For indistinguishability, the
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inputs and outputs of the ideal system TH must be syntactically the same. Syntacti-
cally different user interfaces would either simply prevent the same users from using
alternatively the real or the ideal system, or lead to trivial distinguishability. Hence if
the Dolev-Yao model has a different “core” representation of payloads, there must be a
translation between the input/output representation and this “core” representation. This
holds for all definition variants of BRSIM/UC.
However, once we assume such a translation for real payloads, one might argue
that augmenting it from pure table lookup to performing bitstring XORs, such as of
mr3, m
r
4 and mr1 above, is not a huge addition and not “impossible” for Dolev-Yao
models. Hence we show more complex scenarios in the following where TH would not
only have to evaluate bitstring XORs, but also real cryptographic operations to make a
simulation possible. Thus TH would even more obviously not be a Dolev-Yao model.
4.3 Scenario with Signature Computation
The scenario in Figure 3 additionally exploits a signature operator S as a cryptographic
operation that a Dolev-Yao model should only evaluate symbolically. We assume that
the honest party u already has a pair (sks , pks) of a secret signing key and a public test
key, and that the test key was published, so that the real adversary knows the real public
key pks r. We assume that payloads have no redundant encoding.
xr
xr random
mu = mr
M
u
AH
u
TH AH
u
Sim
xu xu
xr random
XOR(xu, S(sksu, dr)) mr :=
xr Sr(sksr, dr)
xr
mu
XOR(xu, S(sksu, dr))
dr, mr
sr := mr xr;
Tr(pksr, dr, sr)
dr, mr
sr := mr xr;
Tr(pksr, dr, sr)
xa =
XOR(?)
Fig. 3. Scenario with signature computation.
The real adversary sends a random string xr to the machine Mu, which notifies
its user Hu that a message xu has arrived. Then Hu asks its machine Mu to XOR the
received message xu with his or her signature on a payload dr and to output the resulting
payload mr. As we assume that payloads have no redundant encoding, the machine Mu
does not recognize that mr is not an “original” payload. The user Hu and the adversary
A use the real signature test algorithm Tr to verify that the bitstring sr := mr ⊕ xr is a
valid signature on dr with respect to the user’s public key pks r.
For indistinguishability, in the simulation TH must also output a bitstring mr with
this property. However, this intuitively means that TH can compute a cryptographic
signature and is thus not a Dolev-Yao model. More precisely, the simulator, upon getting
xr from A, can essentially only input to TH that an unknown XOR is sent. If this is
the only input, then TH does not even have enough information to compute a correct
mr (but if we assume this we could take the simpler scenario from Section 4.1). If
Sim additionally inputs the real bitstring xr somehow in the representation xa, e.g.,
by claiming that the term x is the XOR of just this one payload xr, then we show by a
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reduction proof that it is actuallyTH that does the main work in computing the signature
sr. We will do this after making more precise assumptions.
5 Common Assumptions for our Main Scenarios
As explained in the introduction, we want to show that it is not possible to securely
implement any Dolev-Yao model by any natural realization of XOR in the sense of
BRSIM/UC. In order to turn this informal meta-theorem into real theorems, we need
assumptions on what characterizes a Dolev-Yao model, a model of XOR in it, and a
real implementation of such a model. We obviously need some such assumptions: The
notion of BRSIM/UC is reflexive. Thus, if an arbitrary Dolev-Yao model with XOR
also counted as real, we would trivially have a secure realization of the system by itself.
The same would hold if an arbitrary real cryptographic system with XOR also counted
as a Dolev-Yao model. But this is not what we want. To make our results as strong as
possible, we only make minimal assumptions. We start with the basic notions of terms,
including an XOR operator.
Definition 1 (Terms of a Dolev-Yao Model with XOR). We require that we can derive
definitions of the following concepts from a Dolev-Yao model with XOR:
a. A set Terms denoting the overall set of valid terms. We speak of atoms and op-
erators denoting the potential leaves and inner nodes, respectively, of the terms
considered as trees. The terms, atoms and operators may be typed. There is an
equivalence relation “≡” on Terms . We call (Terms ,≡) the term algebra.3
b. An operator XOR that is commutative, associative, and where each element is
an inverse of itself. More precisely, we require XOR(t1, t2) ≡ XOR(t2, t1) and
XOR(t1,XOR(t2, t3)) ≡ XOR(XOR(t1, t2), t3) and that XOR(t1, t1) is a neutral
element (for XOR) for all t1, t2, t3 ∈ Terms . (The neutral elements correspond to
all-zero strings; a Dolev-Yao model might represent only one all-zero string, or one
of every possible length.)
c. A set XORable Terms ⊆ Terms of the terms that are valid operands of the oper-
ator XOR.
d. A list operator (possibly implemented by repeated pairing in the original syntax).
Two lists are equivalent iff all their corresponding elements are.
✸
Next we define some minimum actions that the users and the adversary can carry
out on the terms, and the results of these actions. In our context, this is the basis for
showing that our impossibility scenarios are at least executable in every Dolev-Yao
model (which was hopefully intuitively clear).
We already used the notation tu for the representations of a term t for a user with
index u in the informal scenarios. While this notation is certainly more general than
3 Clearly syntactic term equality “=” implies equivalence. Typically “≡” is constructed from
cancellation rules.
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notions that may be familiar to some readers, and thus can only strengthen our impossi-
bility results, let us briefly motivate how it relates to such notions: An important concept
in Dolev-Yao models is that of terms t constructible for some participant u or the ad-
versary (by applying operators and cancellation rules to previously known messages);
however, the syntax for this concept varies considerably. Some high-level representa-
tions, such as the typical arrow pictures, simply use t itself in the protocol represen-
tations, e.g., “E(pke,m)” even when someone who does not know m forwards this
encryption term. More detailed representations typically use the concepts of variables
inherent to the underlying formal protocol languages. A usual case is to match received
messages with a pattern describing the expected message format, and then to use the
pattern variables in subsequent message constructions. To the best of our knowledge,
the first explicit such protocol representation was the PROLOG message derivation in
the Interrogator [71], while pattern matching of an existing calculus was first used for
CSP and FDR in [72]. The syntax of the Dolev-Yao model with BRSIM/UC soundness
in [6] uses local variables called handles and explicit parsing of received messages. The
syntax from all these models can easily be mapped to that in our following definition.
We say that a user u “has” a term representation if it has learned or constructed it.
We do not need a full definition of how this learning and constructing is done; only the
obvious parts that users learns received terms can XOR them. Furthermore, we define
that terms can be sent and that the ideal adversary controls the network as usual in
Dolev-Yao models. Furthermore we require that users can XOR terms.
Definition 2 (Actions on a Dolev-Yao Model with XOR). Users and the ideal adver-
sary can make at least the following inputs into the ideal functionality of a Dolev-Yao
model with XOR, with the described results.
a. If an honest user Hu inputs send(v, tu) for a term representation tu, this leads to
an output receive(u, v, ta) for the adversary.
b. If the adversary inputs send(u, v, ta) for a term representation ta, this leads to an
output receive(u, tv) for user v (i.e., the adversary impersonates u), and outputs
of this format only occur upon such inputs. After such an output, user v “has” the
term representation tv.
c. If a user with index u (honest or the adversary represented by u = a) has term
representations tu1 and tu2 for t1, t2 ∈ XORable Terms , then it also has a rep-
resentation for the term XOR(t1, t2). (Typically this is something like the string
“XOR(tu1 , t
u
2 )”.) ✸
We already discussed in Section 4.2 that payloads are application data, and that
the interface between the users and the real or ideal system must be able to pass these
bitstrings through so that the real system can encrypt real bitstrings etc. We make the
following minimum assumption about this setting.
Definition 3 (Payloads in Dolev-Yao Models). A Dolev-Yao model with payloads al-
lows us to derive a type (subset) payload in the set Terms . In every execution, every
occurring payload term m has a fixed realization mr, and mr = m′r implies m ≡ m′.
For an arbitrary but fixed polynomial plen we can assume that the range of payload
realizations mr contains at least all bitstrings up to the length plen(k), where k is the
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cryptographic security parameter. A real payload mr can always be used as an input
representation mu by user u, and a user u who has any payload representation mu can
ask to have the corresponding payload mr output; then this happens without outputs to
other parties, in particular the ideal adversary. ✸
A general characteristics of real systems is that they are distributed. This means
that each participant u has its own machine, here called Mu, and the machines are
only connected by channels that offer well-defined possibilities for observations and
manipulations by a real adversary. Specifically for the realization of Dolev-Yao models
with XOR, we make the following (natural) minimum assumptions: Real channels are
insecure; the input to send a term t leads to the actual sending of a bitstring tr; and XOR
terms are realized by applying an actual XOR to the realization of the contained terms.
Definition 4 (Pure Realization of a Dolev-Yao Model with XOR). In a pure real-
ization of a Dolev-Yao model with XOR, an input send(v, tu) to a machine Mu re-
leases a bitstring tr to the real adversary such that within one execution of the sys-
tem t ≡ t′ ⇒ tr = t′r for all terms t, t′. We have (XOR(t1, t2))r = tr1 ⊕ tr2 for all
t1, t2 ∈ XORable Terms. ✸
We wrote “pure” in this definition as Dolev-Yao model realizations profit from type
tags, see [73, 6]. For readability we left this option out of the core definition, as with
XORs one must be careful how to apply type tags so that the desired algebraic properties
still hold. Essentially one has to normalize before type tagging, see Section 8.7 for a
concrete version. We sketch in Section 7.1 how the impossibility proofs extend to this
case.
We did not define any ideal secrecy of XORs here, i.e., that an ideal adversary learn-
ing certain XORs cannot derive the individual xored terms. While one would expect this
for positive results, our impossibility results do not rely on such ideal secrecy.
6 Rigorous Impossibility Proofs
In this section we reconsider the scenarios from Section 4 under the rigorous definitions.
We start with the scenario with payload XOR from Figure 2. Here we need more as-
sumptions for proving impossibility than the common assumptions defined in Section 5,
in particular because the common assumptions do not exclude the discussed possibility
that the lookup-translation between real payloads and opaque payload terms is aug-
mented by an actual XOR computation in the ideal system. In contrast, the proof for
the more complex scenario with signatures will not need such additional assumptions
(only a simple assumption that the Dolev-Yao model contains a signature operator).
6.1 Additional Assumptions and Proof for the Scenario with Payload XOR
Intuitively, in the scenario with payload XOR in Section 4.1 we postulated that the
Dolev-Yao model performs no bitstring computations that would allow it to recognize
the term x as the XOR ofm1 andm2 at the end if the ideal adversary, here the simulator,
has not guessed these messages a priori. We define this as follows.
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Definition 5 (Dolev-Yao Model without Bitstring XOR). A Dolev-Yao model with
XOR and payloads is called without bitstring XOR if the following holds: If an input
send(u, v, xa) by the ideal adversary at a time T leads to an output receive(u, xv) for
user Hv with a term x ≡ XOR(m1,m2) such that m1,m2 ∈ payload and m1 6= m2,
and if the terms m1 andm2 were not present by themselves or as subterms in TH before
time T , then the input representation xa explicitly contains the payloadsmr1 and mr2.✸
This is quite normal for Dolev-Yao models if one has accepted that TH, in ad-
dition to the core Dolev-Yao model, contains the translation table between real pay-
loads and their representations: Sim might enter terms like D(E(XOR(m1,m2))) or
XOR(XOR(m1,m3),XOR(m2,m3)) instead of XOR(m1,m2), but m1 and m2 have
to occur somewhere explicitly as long as no prior terms such as t = XOR(m1,m3)
are available where a representation ta might simply be a local variable “t”. We could
also extend this definition to a multi-step interaction between the ideal adversary and
TH if we allowed inputs other than send(u, v, xa) by the ideal adversary; we omit this
extension for readability.
Theorem 1. A Dolev-Yao model without bitstring XOR (Definition 5) and with
payload ⊆ XORable Terms does not have a pure realization (Definition 4) that is
sound in the sense of BRSIM/UC. ✷
Proof. Assume the contrary for a Dolev-Yao model TH and a realization. Definitions 1
to 4 imply that the users and the real adversary can carry out the scenario from Figure 2
with these systems. More precisely, the statement that A and Hu are parametrized with
messages mr1 and mr2 means that we consider a family of honest users Hu,mr1,mr2 and
adversaries Amr
1
,mr
2
, where mr1 and mr2 are arbitrary payloads of a fixed length l ≥ 1
with mr1 6= mr2. (This is possible by Definition 3.) Furthermore, these definitions imply
that in the real system, the result from Mu for Hu,mr
1
,mr
2
is indeed mr = mr2.
Thus for BRSIM/UC soundness, the simulator Sim has to achieve that the ideal sys-
tem TH also outputs mu = mr = mr2 with overwhelming probability, because every
other output would be distinguishable for Hu,mr
1
,mr
2
. The corresponding term m is de-
rived in TH as m := XOR(x,m1). Hence mr = mr2 implies m2 ≡ m ≡ XOR(x,m1)
with Definition 3, and thus x ≡ XOR(m1,m2) with the algebraic properties of XOR
(Definition 1). Here x is the term sent by the ideal adversary; by Definition 2 there must
be exactly one such sending action. Furthermore, mr1 6= mr2 implies m1 6= m2 with
Definition 4. Hence by Definition 5, the ideal adversary cannot achieve this equivalence
without inputting the actual payloadsmr1 and mr2 within the representation xa. The def-
inition is applicable in this scenario because no other term containing m1 and m2 is
available in TH yet.
However, Sim is fixed while we consider the family of users Hu,mr
1
,mr
2
and adver-
saries Amr
1
,mr
2
, and it only obtains the input xr = mr1 ⊕mr2 from Amr1,mr2 . Hence for
every xr and security parameter k, Sim has to choose its guess atmr1 andmr2 with a fixed
distribution Dxr,k. For every such distribution, at least one pair (mr1,mr2) has probabil-
ity at most 2−l, because by Definitions 3 and 4, all bitstrings of length l are possible
payloads. Hence there exists a pair (mr1,mr2) that has probability at most 2−l ≤ 1/2 for
infinitely many values of k (recall that l is a constant, and can actually be very small).
Thus for the corresponding user Hu,mr
1
,mr
2
and adversary Amr
1
,mr
2
, the probability that
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the simulation is correct is at most 1/2 for infinitely many k. This is not overwhelming.
Therefore BRSIM/UC soundness is not possible.
6.2 Reduction Proof for the Scenario with Signatures
Our second scenario uses signatures. However, we do not need any cryptographic prop-
erties, but simply exploit signing as an operator whose realization is typically of sig-
nificant complexity, so that we can argue that an ideal system TH that evaluates the
realization of this operator is not a Dolev-Yao model. We therefore make a minimal
definition without even mentioning the test operator. For notational simplicity, we also
make this definition only for deterministic memory-less signature schemes. This is no
significant restriction in particular as our scenario needs only one signature; moreover
we sketch afterwards why the proof also holds in the general case.
Definition 6 (Minimal Signatures in a Dolev-Yao Model). A Dolev-Yao model with
XOR and a realization according to Definitions 1, 2 and 4 is called with simple sig-
natures if it has an operator S with two parameters where the first denotes the secret
key and the second the signed term such that (S(sks , t))r = Sr(sks r, tr) for the signing
algorithm Sr of a secure cryptographic signature system whenever the term S(sks , t)
is well-defined. Furthermore, it must be possible to publish corresponding public keys
pks in the Dolev-Yao model such that in the realization (sks r, pks r) are a key pair of
the same signature system. ✸
By a secure cryptographic signature scheme we mean one according to the def-
inition from [74]. For the following theorem we only need the simplest part of this
definition: Signatures correctly made with a secret key sks r pass the test with the cor-
responding public key pks r; we call this “valid with respect to pks r”. We only use the
security in the complexity arguments after the theorem. We assume without loss of gen-
erality that for a given security parameter k and a given message length l, all signatures
have a fixed length slen(k, l).
We now state precisely what we prove with the scenario from Figure 3.
Theorem 2. Let TH be a Dolev-Yao model with XOR, payloads, and simple signatures
and with a realization that is secure in the sense of BRSIM/UC (Definitions 1 to 4
and 6), and let payloads and signatures be in the set XORable Terms . Then TH can
be used to compute a real signature on an arbitrary message of length k with respect
to the signature scheme used in the given realization. The reduction algorithm Sig that
computes a signature using TH as a subprogram only needs time linear in slen(k, k),
the signature length for messages of length k. (Here we do not count the time that TH
needs.) ✷
This theorem shows that a machine TH that offers the external functionality of a
Dolev-Yao model with XOR and has a secure cryptographic realization cannot be what
one would intuitively call a Dolev-Yao model. For instance, if it has any secure real-
ization with a signature scheme where the signatures are reasonably short, concretely
where slen(k, k) is at most linear in k, but signing takes time of the order of at least
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k2, then TH performs the bulk of the signature computation in the reduction. We chose
the message length k for simplicity and because typically the bulk of a signature com-
putation only happens on one hash value; we could argue similarly with other message
lengths.
Proof. (Of Theorem 2.) Let the preconditions of the theorem be true. The definitions
imply that the honest user Hu and the real adversary A can carry out the scenario from
Figure 3 with the given Dolev-Yao model and realization, including the initial key gen-
eration and publication that is only described in the text in Section 4.3. More precisely,
we assume that Hu consists of a fixed protocol component H′u that receives its payload
input dr of length k from a second component H∗u (typically a higher level protocol or a
human), and that A chooses xr randomly among the bitstrings of length slen(k, k). The
definitions imply that in the real system, the bitstring sr := mr⊕xr (computed with the
output mr of Mu) is indeed a signature on dr valid with respect to pks r.
Thus the assumed successful simulator Sim must also achieve that TH outputs a
value mr to Hu such that the resulting value sr is a valid signature on dr with over-
whelming probability, because otherwise A and Hu together (via external communica-
tion) can distinguish the interaction with TH and Sim from the interaction with the real
machine Mu.
We now construct a machine Sig with TH as a blackbox that carries out key gen-
eration and signs one message, i.e., Sig is our reduction algorithm. While Sig also uses
the other participants of the ideal system as blackboxes, the steps of all those have to be
counted within the complexity of what Sig does itself.
– Key generation. Initially Sig runs the honest user component H′u and the simula-
tor Sim for generating a real signature key pair (sks r, pks r) and publishing pks r to
A. Our machine Sig publishes this key pks r as the key for which it will make a
signature. It further generates a random string xr as A would and resumes running
Sim to produce the ideal version of this message that it passes to TH in a mes-
sage send(v, u, xa). By Definition 2 there must be exactly one such sending action.
In response TH gives Sig (here in the role of the user component H′u) an output
receive(v, xu).
– Computing one signature. When Sig is asked to sign a payload dr (with respect to
its only keypair), it asks TH (as H′u would do) to XOR the term represented by xu
with a signature on the payload dr and to output the resulting payload. It waits for
the output mr from TH and outputs sr := mr ⊕ xr as its signature.
It follows immediately from the initial discussion about the result of Sim and TH
that the output sr of Sig is indeed a signature on dr valid with respect to pks r with
overwhelming probability.
In the signing phase (the only phase for which we claim a highly efficient reduc-
tion), Sig does only two things itself: First it makes the user input that requests the
computation of a signature, an XOR, and the output of the resulting payload. This is
the input of a fixed small term or program-like string, where even the representation
xu is already fixed at least since the key generation. Later Sig computes a real XOR.
This needs time linear in the signature length slen(k, k), as xr was chosen of the same
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length and consequentlymr is also of this length.4 This finishes the reduction proof that
using TH plus only computation linear in the length of a signature, we can compute a
cryptographic signature (of whatever signature system is used in the realization).
In this proof, the signature scheme in the realization could also be probabilistic
and/or with memory: Only one signature is ever computed, and we only argue that
this signature passes the test. To rigorously cover this case, we would have to adapt
Definition 6 such that the signature terms in the ideal system have an additional tag,
e.g., a counter as in [6].
7 Scenario Extensions
We have now proved, using certain scenarios as counterexamples, that under reasonable,
common assumptions about Dolev-Yao models and their realizations, the realizations
cannot be BRSIM/UC sound. Even if we stick to the strong BRSIM/UC soundness
with its general composability, this still leaves some options for positive results if we
give up some of the assumptions. Three possibilities in particular come to mind: First,
change the XOR realization or the representation of payloads within the realization to
include some additional redundancy, at least type tags. Secondly, restrict the users H
to certain protocol classes. Thirdly, consider Dolev-Yao models without payloads, as
our two main scenarios were based on payloads, and there are protocol classes without
payloads, or at least without general payloads from large real domains. We now present
extended scenarios that are still impossible after certain concrete instantiations of these
changes.
7.1 Extensions for Low Redundancy in Payloads or XORs
So far we assumed that payloads can be arbitrary bitstrings, and that they are used in
the realization in their original form, and that the XOR operator is implemented directly
as the real⊕. However, at least type tags are not unknown in realizations of Dolev-Yao
models, and there might be other forms of structured low redundancy, such as payloads
encoded in ASCII or XML.
The scenario with payload XOR (Figure 2) is essentially unaffected by such
changes: In the real system, xr has an xor tag. XORing it with m1 means that the
real operation ⊕ is applied to the untagged part of xr and the full mr1. In general, the
result would get an xor tag again, but here the result is output as a payload, and thus
without the xor tag. As to the payloads, tags in a fixed place make no difference to the
proof. The effect of redundancy in the payloads themselves was already discussed in
Section 4.2.
For the scenario with signature computation (Figure 3), we have to be more careful
with redundancy, because the real machine Mu might usually output an error ↓ instead
4 By making xr shorter, we could achieve that Sig computes the XOR of even fewer bits, but
Sig still at least has to output the entire signature. Therefore we chose a scenario that remains
valid in protocol classes that only allow XORs of strings of equal length.
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of mr if mr is not of the correct payload format. Nevertheless, as long as the valid pay-
load strings are not negligible within the family of sets of all strings of length l (where l
is the index of the family), thenmr is still output with not negligible probability, because
it is uniformly random (a fresh one-time pad xr XORed with a fixed string). Thus TH
can still be used in the reduction proof to compute actual signatures with not negligible
probability, which, intuitively, contradicts the Dolev-Yao property.
In some real implementations of type systems on strings, in particular XML, the
overall part of a string that is fixed by a type is of considerable length. Then the scenario
with its random choice of xr no longer works. However, a similar attack works for
many realistic cases: Assume that a subset Fixbitspayload,l of the bits of the encoded
payloads is fixed (e.g., the opening and closing XML tags), and similarly Fixbits sig,l for
signatures. We can increase the latter set by only considering signatures made with one
known algorithm and with respect to the known public key pks r. Now if Fixbits sig,l ⊇
Fixbitspayload,l, the adversary A can predetermine the necessary bits of mr in xr by
XORing them with the corresponding fixed bits of a signature.
7.2 Extensions for Protocol Restrictions
If every permitted global H (representing the entirety of all users) consists of a protocol
prot from a restricted class Prots and a user H′ of prot , then a scenario only remains
a valid counterexample if there is a protocol in Prots where one honest party acts like
Hu in the scenario.
For the scenario with payload XOR (Figure 2) it is easy to see for a given class
Prots whether this is true, or can be adapted. Essentially, if XORs contain at most one
payload in this protocol class, the scenario cannot be carried out. If the protocol class
allows XORs where two components are payloads, it seems reasonable that the protocol
class also allows users to subtract one payload from such an XOR and to retrieve the
remaining payload; then the scenario works.
For the scenario with signature computation (Figure 3), a simple protocol where
party u acts as in the scenario can be written as follows in the typical high-level arrow
notation for simple security protocols, and where d and sks are secrets known to parties
u and v.
v → u : m⊕ S(sks , d);
u : Output m.
This protocol only makes sense for deterministic signature schemes so that party u
subtracts the same real signature that v added. As party u (both the user and the machine
acting for it) cannot know whether party v really started this protocol, it applies its
protocol step whenever it gets a message xu supposedly from v. Thus it acts as in
Figure 3. If a protocol class does not allow secret signing keys to be known to two
parties, one alternative is to use a symmetric primitive instead of the signature. For
making this extension rigorous, one needs a definition of the symmetric primitive used
similar to Definition 6. Another alternative is to add an initial step where the signature
is exchanged in encrypted form; now we can also use a probabilistic signature scheme
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Fig. 4. Scenario without payloads.
again because v reuses a signature computed by u.
u→ v : E(pkev , S(sksu , d));
v → u : m⊕ S(sksu , d);
u : Output m.
Here pkeu denotes the public encryption key of party v and sksv the secret signing key
of party u. For making this extension rigorous, one needs a definition of of public-key
encryption including the requirement that an encrypted message is secret in the ideal
system, except possibly its structure and length. Then the ideal adversary in this exten-
sion does not learn the signature and the signed message d. Hence nor does the simula-
tor, and thus, when the simulator constructs xa, it is essentially in the same position as
before.
7.3 Scenario without Payloads
Finally, we consider a Dolev-Yao model without any payloads, or a realization where
payloads have or are encoded with significant redundancy, so that none of the prior sce-
narios works. In particular, we can no longer cause Mu to output a significant bitstring
to Hu, like the former mr. Hence we only prove a reduction where TH essentially tests
a signature instead of computing one; the reduction is also less efficient. The scenario
is shown in Figure 4. We use nonces, another typical data type in Dolev-Yao models.
They correspond to random or pseudorandom values in typical realizations. We assume
that the nonce realizations can be arbitrary bitstrings of a length l suitable to hide a
signature in an XOR. (In a tagged version the nonce tag should not extend beyond the
signature tag; we now argue with an untagged version for readability.)
In the real system, we assume that the adversaryA already has a secret signature key
sks r and has published the corresponding public key pks r. Now A randomly chooses
nonces nri for i = 1, . . . , 2l, repeating each choice until the first l nonces are linearly in-
dependent, and so are the second l nonces. Next A sends the nonces to the machine Mu,
which notifies its user Hu with representations nui of these nonces. The adversary also
chooses random bits b1, . . . , b2l and computes the linear combinations dr :=
∑l
i=1 bin
r
i
and N r :=
∑2l
i=l+1 bin
r
i of the nonces. Both dr and N r are random values if one does
not know the bits bi. The adversary computes a signature sr on dr with the secret key
sks r and sends xr := sr ⊕ N r to Mu, which notifies its user Hu with a representation
xu of this message.
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Now the adversary sends the bits b1, . . . , b2l to the user Hu outside the system,
corresponding to a chosen-message attack. User Hu asks its machine Mu to subtract the
appropriate nonces from xu, i.e., each nui with i > l and bi = 1. This is abbreviated
by “Nu” in Figure 4. User Hu then asks Mu to test whether the result su is a correct
signature on the message obtained by XORing the other appropriate set of nonces, i.e.,
each nui with i ≤ l and bi = 1. This is abbreviated by “du” in Figure 4. Alternatively, the
adversary does the same with an incorrect signature s′r. The real machine Mu always
decides this correctly; we denote its output by a Boolean value B.
Now assume a simulator Sim correctly simulates this scenario. Thus Sim must
achieve that the Dolev-Yao model TH makes the same correct output B to Hu after
the same interactions with A and Hu with overwhelming probability.
Intuitively, we show that TH must be able to test cryptographic signatures for this.
However, we are not aware of a prior definition of what it means that an algorithm
tests signatures correctly with overwhelming probability (in contrast to always), i.e., in
what probability space over messages and signatures this must be true. For instance,
if we input random values as potential signatures, the algorithm may be correct with
overwhelming probability by always outputting false because the signatures may be
sparse. Or if we input either a correct signature or a random value, there may be so
much trivial redundancy in the real signatures that a very simple algorithm can usually
make the distinction. We deal with this problem as follows: We allow a second, arbitrary
(probabilistic polynomial-time) algorithm F (for “fake”) that tries to fake signatures,
given a public key. It must always output invalid signatures. Let F be the set of such
algorithms. Intuitively a good algorithm F makes its fakes as plausible as possible. For
instance, for RSA signatures with additional tags and a field for the signed data, it
might set these tags and the signed data correctly, and choose the rest randomly from
the correct mathematical group.
Definition 7 (Signature Test Approximation). Given a signature system (Gr, Sr,Tr),
a pair of algorithms TA = (TA1,TA2) is a test approximation if the following holds for
all signature-faking algorithms F ∈ F :
Pr[b∗ 6= b :: (sks r, pks r)← Gr(1k); v r ← TA1(pks
r);
(mr, sr0)← F(pks
r); sr1 ← S
r(sks r,mr);
b ∈R {0, 1}; b
∗← TA2(pks
r,mr, srb, v
r)]
∈ NEGL.
Here NEGL is the set of negligible functions and∈R is the random uniform choice from
a set. The notation Pr[E :: A] means the probability of the event E in the probability
space defined by the probabilistic algorithm A. ✸
Splitting TA into two algorithms TA1 and TA2 allows us to reason separately about the
complexity of pre-computations given only the public key pks r, and of the algorithm
for distinguishing a fake and a real signature. The precomputations are done by TA1,
which outputs its result as an intermediary value v r. Later TA2 tries to distinguish a real
or fake signature, using v r as an additional input.
As a reduction proof, we construct a test approximation TA with the given TH as
a blackbox. It also uses Sim as a blackbox and simulates the actions of Hu and A, but
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those steps count among the additional complexity of TA. In the key distribution phase,
TA1 obtains a public signature key pksr from A and runs the actions of Sim on this key
together with TH. It then runs A and Sim choosing 2l nonces together with TH. It also
computes the inverses M−11 and M−12 of the matrices M1 and M2 constructed from
the nonces n1, . . . , nl and nl+1, . . . , n2l, respectively. This will later allow for solving
equations of the form dr =
∑l
i=1 bin
r
i and N r =
∑2l
i=l+1 bin
r
i for a vector b more
quickly. Finally, TA1 chooses a random string xr and runs Sim upon receipt of xr as a
message from the adversary for participant u. All the values computed by TA1 become
part of a tuple v r.
Later TA2 is given the public key pks r, a message mr, a supposed signature srb, and
the tuple v r of values precomputed by TA1. It first computes the one-time pad N r that
makes srb fit the previously chosen xr from v r by setting N r := srb ⊕ xr. It then solves
the equations N r =
∑2l
i=l+1 bin
r
i and mr =
∑l
i=1 bin
r
i for a vector b using M
−1
2 and
M−11 from v r. Next, TA2 causes TH to subtract the nonce denoted by Nu from xu:
For all i ∈ {l + 1, . . . , 2l} with bi = 1, it asks TH to XOR the i-th nonce to the term
represented by xu. In this situation Mu would obtain the result sr = srb. Then TA2
causes TH to construct du, i.e., it asks TH to XOR the i-th nonce for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}
with bi = 1. In this situation Mu would obtain the result dr. Thus, when TA2 finally
inputs the signature test command for su, then Mu would output B = true if b = 1 and
B = false if b = 0. Hence TH does the same with overwhelming probability, which
shows that TA = (TA1,TA2) is a valid test approximation.
The algorithm TA2 for testing the validity of a signature does only two things itself:
First it makes the user inputs requesting the computation of two XORs (one for subtract-
ing the nonces from the signature, the other for constructing the message represented as
du) and the testing of a signature. This is the input of two terms or program-like string
of length linear in l. Secondly, it solves two linear equation systems given the respec-
tive inverse matrices. This is standard matrix-vector multiplication; it can be done in
time quadratic in l, where l was the length of a signature. This reduction again seems
a clear indication that TH can test the validity of signatures and is thus not what one
would intuitively call a Dolev-Yao model. Even though the complexity of the reduction
is not as convincing as for the scenario with signature computation, we also know the
exact reduction algorithm TA2. If any realization existed where TH would not do the
major part of the signature testing, then the major part of this testing would have to be
the matrix-vector multiplication of TA2. This is a very serious restriction on potential
realizations.
8 A Passively BRSIM/UC-Sound Dolev-Yao Model of XOR
The special Dolev-Yao model of XOR that we prove to be sound corresponds to passive
attacks only, together with a type consistency requirement on the protocol expressed
in the Dolev-Yao model. In other respects the result is strong: We show BRSIM/UC
soundness and need no restrictions on the other operations in the Dolev-Yao model; this
distinguishes our result from those in [40, 42]. Roughly, the benefit of the restriction to
passive adversaries is that all XORs are constructed bottom-up by honest parties. Thus
the simulator never receives bitstrings that seem to be XORs but where the simulator
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does not know how to partition the XOR into its components, as in the impossibility
scenarios in the previous sections. The need for the type consistency requirement is
shown in Section 8.1.
In Sections 8.2 to 8.6, we present our Dolev-Yao version of XOR in detail, in par-
ticular the extended adversary parsing capabilities that we need according to Section 2.
As we aim at an overall, operator-rich Dolev-Yao model with XOR, we need an under-
lying Dolev-Yao model with the other usual cryptographic operators and a realization
secure in the sense of BRSIM/UC. Hence we have to use the Dolev-Yao model of [6].
Essentially we only add XOR terms and operations to this model. We also add a type
for nonces of variable length. Typically, Dolev-Yao models have only one nonce type,
and realizations use random bitstrings of a fixed length sufficient for unguessability.
However, we now want to hide arbitrary other terms by XORing them with a nonce of
suitable length. To make these additions to the existing model rigorous, we have to use
the notation from [6] instead of our generic notation from Section 5. We will mention
the links between the notations.
In Section 8.7, we present the cryptographic realization of this Dolev-Yao model of
XOR; in Section 8.8 we sketch that this realization is as secure as the Dolev-Yao model
in the sense of BRSIM/UC if restricted to passive adversaries and type consistency.
8.1 The Necessity of Correct Type Conversions by the Users or Protocols
The largest difficulty with XOR even in the passive case is typing. XORs can yield
arbitrary bitstrings, while otherwise it seems necessary for achieving BRSIM/UC that
the Dolev-Yao model is strongly typed. The reason is that the Dolev-Yao model must
make a decision what happens if a destructor is applied to a term that is not properly
constructed, e.g., if decryption is applied to a term that is not encrypted at all or with a
different key. The only decision that seems consistently realizable with real cryptosys-
tems is to prescribe that the result is an error. In other words, the terms are consid-
ered typed, and many operations (in particular destructors) yield errors when applied
to wrong types. In the cryptographic implementation, this must be realized by explicit
type tags.
For XOR, however, algebraic equations like commutativity and associativity are
essential, and they apply to pure bitstrings, not to bitstrings with type tags. The main
problem with this typing occurs when converting an XOR back into the original element
type. This is a standard situation when XOR is used for explicit or implicit encryption:
At some time, the subterms in an XOR cancel out except for one; typically all the ran-
dom subterms cancel out and one term of another type remains, e.g., a payload. This
subterm must be usable by its recipient according to its original type. This is easy to
realize in the Dolev-Yao model because one can retain the knowledge of the original
type of the subterm. However, in a real, distributed cryptographic system, this is not
possible: When a machine XORs two bitstrings, it cannot reliably decide whether the
result is of an underlying type. This is obvious if all type tags are removed before XOR-
ing (which is one possibility, and comes closest to typical message formats in XORs).
It is also true if we XOR base types including their type tags, e.g., data for payloads
or sig for a signature, because these tags can occur by chance when XORing arbitrary
strings. Then a participant in the cryptographic realization would get a result (e.g., a
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payload) that is totally unpredictable in the Dolev-Yao model. One natural solution to
circumvent this problem is to forbid wrong typecasts on the user layer. This may sound
like a strong restriction, but actually XOR is an operation that a cryptographic library
should not offer to end users (e.g., a mail program), but only to cryptographic protocols.
For a given protocol it is usually clear what types are expected in what messages, and
thus, e.g., in which step an XOR operation should yield a payload. Whether a protocol
is correctly typed in this sense can be verified on the protocol layer if we only allow
passive attacks.
For simplicity, we treat the length of the resulting term in a type conversion from
an XOR back to another type in the same way, i.e., the user enters the correct length of
the desired term. An advantage of this solution is that it allows a simple realization. In
particular, for the most common case of protocols that only XOR terms of equal length,
these realizations correspond to plain XORs without additional length fields or leakages
of the term structure.
8.2 Notation
We first repeat important notation from [6], and then introduce additional notation for
lists and matrices. As before, we write “:=” for deterministic and “←” for probabilistic
assignment, and we write “ R←” for uniform random choice from a set. By x := ++y
for integer variables x, y we mean y := y + 1;x := y. The length of a message
mr is denoted as len(mr), and ↓ is an error element available as an addition to the
domains and ranges of all functions and algorithms. The list operation is denoted as
l := (x1, . . . , xj), and the arguments are unambiguously retrievable as l[i], with l[i] = ↓
if i > j. A database D is a set of functions, called entries, each over a finite domain
called attributes. For an entry x ∈ D, the value at an attribute att is written x.att .
For a predicate pred involving attributes, D[pred ] means the subset of entries whose
attributes fulfill pred . If D[pred ] contains only one element, we use the same notation
for this element. Adding an entry x to D is abbreviated D :⇐ x.
For lists, we define operators tail, append, and sort (with any number of arguments)
in the usual way, where we assume that sort proceeds according to a given standard
order < on list elements. As inputs to sort, we allow sets and lists. Additionally, we
define an operator normalize that corresponds to the cancellation rules in an XOR, i.e.,
normalize first removes duplicates from the input list, leaving one element whenever
there is an odd number of equal elements, and then applies sort to the resulting list.
The elements of a matrix M ∈ Fm,n over a field F are denoted by Mi,j with
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By solve(M, v) we denote an algorithm that, given
a matrix M ∈ Fm,n and a vector v ∈ Fm, outputs a solution b ∈ Fn of the equation
Mb = v if a solution exists, and otherwise ↓. Such an algorithm can, e.g., be built from
Gaussian elimination.
8.3 Trusted-Host Machine and Overall Parameters
The underlying system model in [6] is an I/O-automata model. Hence the overall Dolev-
Yao model, with its state, is represented as a machine TH, called trusted host, as in
Figure 1. Let H = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of honest users. As we consider passive
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attacks only, there are no corrupted users. For each u ∈ H, the trusted host TH has a port
inu? for inputs from Hu and a port outu ! for outputs to Hu, and it has analogous ports
ina? and outa! for the adversary. The trusted host keeps track of the length of messages
(this is needed because this length may be leaked to the adversary when honest parties
send encrypted messages) using a tuple L of length functions of abstract terms; these
length functions can be arbitrary polynomials. One function from L that we mention
below is max len(k), which denotes the maximum length of processed messages. We
extend L by two functions xor len((l1, t1), . . . , (lj , tj)) for computing the length of an
abstract XOR from the lengths li and types ti of its parameters, and nonce vl len(l) for
the overall length of a nonce of variable length l (where l corresponds to the desired
entropy).
8.4 States: Term Database
The main part of the state of the Dolev-Yao model, i.e., of the machine TH, is a term
database D. Each term is primarily given by its type (top-level operator) and top-level
argument list. The non-atomic arguments in this list are pointers to the respective sub-
terms. For this, each term entry in D contains a global index that allows us (not the
participants) to refer to terms unambiguously. In addition, the term database D contains
the length of each term and handles that represent local names under which the differ-
ent participants know the term, if they do know it. In particular, the handles imply the
knowledge sets known from other Dolev-Yao models. The handles are a specific instan-
tiation of the term representations from Definition 2. Recall that a mapping from the
database representation to a more standard term representation is now available in [29].
In detail, the attributes of the term database D are defined as follows; the only
differences to [6] due to adding XOR are an augmented type set, the introduction of the
set randomtypes , and a new attribute parsed that we need within the treatment of the
parsing of terms that contain several XORs.
– ind ∈ INDS , called index, consecutively numbers all entries in D. The set
INDS is isomorphic to N. The index is used as a primary key attribute, i.e., one
can write D[i] for the selection D[ind = i].
– type ∈ typeset is the type of the entry. We add types xor and nonce vl to typeset
from [6], denoting the types for XOR and for nonces of variable length. We let
the set randomtypes := {nonce, nonce vl} denote the set of random types. We
say random value to denote an element of a type in randomtypes . Similarly,
secrettypes ⊆ typeset from [6] denotes a set of secret types, whose elements must
not be put into messages.
– x.arg = (a1, a2, . . . , aj) is a possibly empty list of arguments. Many values ai are
indices of other entries in D and thus in INDS ; they are sometimes distinguished
by a superscript “ind”.
– x.hndu ∈ HNDS ∪{↓} for u ∈ H∪{a} are handles by which a user or adversary
u knows this entry. The value ↓ means that u does not know this entry. The set
HNDS is isomorphic to N. We always use a superscript “hnd” for handles.
– x.len ∈ N0 denotes the “length” of the term. It is computed using the functions
from the parameter tuple L.
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– x.parsed ∈ {1, ↓} denotes whether the ideal adversary has already parsed this term.
Most entries have no attribute parsed ; so x.parsed = ↓.
Initially, D is empty. As additional state parts, TH has a counter size ∈ INDS for the
current size of D, and counters curhndu (current handle) for u ∈ H ∪ {a}, denoting
the most recent handle number assigned for u. These counters are all initialized with 0.
Moreover,TH maintains explicit counters and message bounds for each port in order to
ensure polynomial runtime; see [6] for the details.
The algorithm ihnd ← ind2hndu(i) for i ∈ INDS (with side effect) denotes
that TH determines a handle ihnd for user u to the database entry (term) D[i]: If
ihnd := D[i].hndu 6= ↓, it returns that, else it sets and returns ihnd := D[i].hndu :=
++curhndu . The algorithm is extended for i 6∈ INDS by the identity function. The
algorithm ind2hnd∗u for lists applies ind2hndu to each element of its input list.
8.5 Derived Matrices for XORs
For the linear algebra resulting from XORs, we define several matrices over GF(2) rep-
resenting released XORs, i.e., XORs that the adversary learned. The rows and columns
correspond to indices in the term databaseD. Roughly, coefficient 1 in row i and column
j indicates that the i-th term in D is a top-level XOR-component in the j-th term and
that the adversary has learned the j-th term. We also make such matrix entries for each
released individual random value. The matrix A indicates the non-random components
in each released XOR, while R(l) for each l ∈ N indicates the random components of
length at least l, and R¯(l) those of length less than l. These matrices and lists are derived
from a given term database D, but as D will always be clear from the context we do not
write it as a parameter.
More precisely, we define three matrices A, R(l), and R¯(l) in GF(2)size,size . Here
Ai,j = 1 iff D[i].type 6∈ randomtypes and D[j].type = xor and D[j].parsed = 1
and i ∈ D[j].arg . Similarly, R(l)i,j = 1 iff D[i].type ∈ randomtypes and D[i].len ≥ l
and D[j].type = xor and either D[j].type = xor and i ∈ D[j].arg , or D[j].type ∈
randomtypes and i = j. The same formula, except with “D[i].len < l”, defines R¯(l).
The condition D[i].parsed = 1 reflects that an XOR only gets a column when it has
been parsed. (Recall that we will need this for treating terms with several, possibly
nested, XORs.)
Figure 5 gives an example of this matrix representation: The terms in D are three
nonces ni of length l, two payloads di, and two XORs xi. The adversary has learned
and parsed the two XORs and the third nonce. The matrix in the figure is the OR of A
and R(l): The matrix R(l) has the depicted rows for the nonces, but only zeroes in the
rows for payloads, and vice versa for A. The matrix R¯(l) contains only zeroes.
8.6 New Inputs and their Evaluation
Operations are triggered by so-called input commands from users or the adversary into
TH. In these commands, the users refer to the terms by the handles defined in Sec-
tion 8.4. The normal cryptographic operations are called basic commands. They are
accepted at each input port inu? with u ∈ H ∪ {a} and have only local effects, i.e.,
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n1 n2 n3 d1 d2 x1 x2
n1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
n2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
n3 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
d1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
d2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
x1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
x2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fig. 5. Example of the matrix representation of XORs. The XORs are x1 = n1 ⊕ n3 ⊕ d1 and
x2 = n2 ⊕ n3 ⊕ d1 ⊕ d2.
only an output at outu? occurs and only handles for u are involved. The additional
term-handling capabilities of the adversary are called local adversary commands. They
are only accepted at ina?. Finally, send commands model the transfer of terms to other
users. In our case with passive adversaries only, we only use the command for sending
a term in an authentic way. Its effect is that the adversary immediately gets a handle to
the sent term, and if the channel is later scheduled, the intended recipient also gets a
handle to the sent term.
The notation j ← op(i) means that TH is scheduled with an input op(i) at some
port inu? (where we always use u as the index of that port) and returns j at outu !.
Handle arguments are tacitly required to be inHNDS and existing, i.e.,≤ curhndu , at
the time of the command execution; else the command execution immediately aborts.
The XOR operation immediately normalizes its arguments into one list, i.e., if some
of its inputs are already terms of type xor, it joins their argument lists, adds the other
inputs to this list, and then removes duplicates in the list. If the list is now empty,
the entry corresponds to the all-zero string of the respective length. We also define a
command to convert an XOR back into another type; this conversion succeeds only if
the XOR has only one argument of this type and the desired length. Furthermore, we
define a command that creates a nonce of variable length.
Definition 8. (Basic commands for XOR and for nonces of variable length) The trusted
host TH extended by XOR and nonces of variable length accepts the following addi-
tional commands at every port inu?.
– Generate XOR: xhnd ← xor(mhnd1 , . . . ,mhndj ) for 0 ≤ j ≤ max len(k).
For i = 1, . . . , j, let mi := D[hndu = mhndi ].ind and li := D[mi].len and
ti := D[mi].type . Let l := xor len((l1, t1), . . . , (lj , tj)). If l > max len(k) or
ti ∈ secrettypes for some i ∈ {1, . . . , j}, then return ↓.
For i = 1, . . . , j, let argi := D[mi].arg if ti = xor, else argi := (mi). Let
x arg := normalize(append(arg1, . . . , argj )). Set xhnd := ++curhndu and make
a new entry in the term database as D :⇐ (ind := ++size, type := xor, arg :=
x arg, hndu := x
hnd, len := l).
– Type conversion of XOR: mhnd ← conv xor to type(xhnd, l) with type ∈ typeset \
({xor} ∪ secrettypes) and 0 ≤ l ≤ max len(k).
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Let x := D[hndu = xhnd ∧ type = xor].ind , (x1, . . . , xj) := D[x].arg , and
t := D[x1].type . If j 6= 1 or t 6= type or D[x1].len 6= l then return ↓, else return
mhnd := ind2hndu(x1).
– Generate variable-length nonce: nhnd ← gen nonce vl(l) for nonce len(k) ≤ l ≤
max len(k).
Let l∗ := nonce vl len(l). If l∗ > max len(k) then return ↓. Else set nhnd :=
++curhnd and make a new entry in the term database as D :⇐ (ind :=
++size, type := nonce vl, arg := (), hndu := n
hnd, len := l∗). ✸
As we have excluded active attacks and any specific vulnerabilities they might add
even to the Dolev-Yao model, we do not need to introduce new local adversary com-
mands. We only extend the command adv parse, which allows the ideal adversary to
retrieve the arguments of an obtained term (represented by a handle) depending on
whether the top-level operation of this term should ideally be invertible by the adver-
sary. For an XOR term, the basic idea is to determine whether the part consisting of ran-
dom values is linearly independent from the corresponding parts in previously released
XORs and individually released nonces. If yes, we consider this part to hide the other
components of the XOR. Otherwise, we obey the XOR-parsing need from Section 2 by
giving the ideal adversary the non-random arguments of the linear combination of the
new XOR and previous XORs whose random elements cancel each other.
There are two small complications: First, as we have terms of arbitrary length, we
introduced nonces of arbitrary length, and we now have to be careful that the nonces are
indeed of sufficient length. In most protocols, all the nonces in one XOR are simply of
the same length. In general, we consider the length l of the longest non-random element
in the XOR that is not yet known to the ideal adversary. For simplicity, if the ideal
adversary can cancel all the nonces of length at least l by a linear combination, we let
the ideal adversary learn not only the non-random elements, but also the shorter nonces
in that linear combination. This leaves room for improvements, e.g., by only granting
the ideal adversary the XOR of those nonces, but at the cost of a more complicated
proof that only serves a very rare class of protocols. Secondly, when considering one
XOR we only use those other XORs that have already been parsed.
Whenever the adversary learns a term of a random type, we also determine whether
it is linearly dependent from XORs and nonces released earlier. This concerns the new
type nonce vl and the old type nonce.
Definition 9. (Adversary parameter retrieval for XOR and nonces of variable length)
The execution of the existing command (type, arg) ← adv parse(mhnd) always starts
by setting m := D[hnda = mhnd].ind and type := D[m].type, while the output arg
depends on the type. We add the definition for type ∈ {xor, nonce vl} and extend the
definition for type = nonce.
– If type = xor: Set D[m].parsed := 1. Let (x1, . . . , xh) := D[m].arg and l :=
max({D[xi].len | D[xi].type 6∈ randomtypes ∧ D[xi].hnda = ↓}). Let a, r(l),
and r¯(l) denote the vectors that this newly parsed XOR will add (as columns) to the
matrices A, R(l), and R¯(l), respectively. Let b ← solve(R(l), r(l)). If b = ↓, return
arg := (independent, D[m].len). Otherwise, let d := Ab ⊕ a and r′ := R¯(l)b ⊕
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r¯(l).5 Let B := {ind2hnda(i) | bi = 1} and D := {ind2hnda(i) | di = 1 ∨ r′i = 1}
and arg := (dependent,B,D, D[m].len).
– If type = nonce vl: Set D[m].parsed := 1. Let l := D[m].len . Let r(l) de-
note the vector that this newly parsed nonce will add to the matrix R(l). Let
b ← solve(R(l), r(l)). If b = ↓, return arg := (independent, l). Else derive a
result arg := (dependent,B,D, l) exactly as for the type xor.
– If type = nonce: SetD[m].parsed := 1 and similarly define arg := (independent)
or derive a result arg = (dependent,B,D) as for the type nonce vl; the parameter
l is not needed since elements of type nonce have a fixed length. (In the system
without XOR, the result for nonces was simply arg = ().) ✸
In the example from Figure 5, if the adversary next learns a term x3 = n1 ⊕ d2,
then the random part is n1, which is the XOR of the random parts of the previously
released terms n3 and x1. Thus the result of adv parse for this new term x3 is is of
the form (xor, (dependent,B,D, l)) where B is derived from b = 0010010; the XOR
where these random parts cancel out is d = n3⊕x1⊕x3 = d1⊕d2, and thusD consists
of the adversary handles of d1 and d2.
8.7 Realization of this Dolev-Yao Model of XOR
We now present the core parts of the concrete realization of the Dolev-Yao model of
XOR presented in the previous section. As in Figure 1, every user u has its own ma-
chine called Mu. This machine contains the cryptographic objects that user u knows.
It offers its user the same interface as the Dolev-Yao model, i.e., it has ports inu?
and outu ! and accepts the same commands there, in particular xor, gen nonce vl, and
conv xor to type with the same parameters as in Definition 8. In the real system, send-
ing a term on an authentic channel (recall that we consider only passive attacks) releases
the actual bitstring to the adversary, and once the channel is scheduled, also to the in-
tended recipient machine Mv.
As a specialization of the underlying system from [6] we assume that all the real
type tags are, when the abstract syntax is encoded into bitstrings, of equal length tlen
and attached at the left side of the bitstring. As abstract syntax we still write lists and
use a larger alphabet, e.g., we write (nonce, 1100111) for a tagged nonce where nonce
is the type tag.
As the most important part of the realization, we present the functional parts of the
basic commands, i.e., the core operations on bitstrings (with type tags etc.) without the
state-keeping part of the commands. These operations are quite natural given the prior
discussions about typing and lengths: Whenever several typed bitstrings are XORed,
we remove their type tags, pad the remainders with zeros on the left to the maximum
occurring length, XOR them, and finally add an XOR tag to the resulting string. In the
conversion back from an XOR to a base type, the XOR tag is replaced by the target
5 These are the same linear combination of XORs, including the new one, for which we just
saw that the random components of at least length l cancel out. Hence we let the ideal ad-
versary learn the non-random elements designated by the vector d and the short random parts
designated by r′, as well as which previously learned terms are used in this linear combination.
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tag and padding is removed according to the target length input by the user. This target
length is the overall length with the type tag. In contrast, for the nonce constructor we
assume that the input length designates the number of real random bits. In the notation
of the impossibility sections, all these bitstrings would get a superscript r. We omit
this superscript in the following to stay close to the notation of the underlying system
from [6].
Definition 10. (Functional part of the realization of the basic commands for XOR and
nonces of variable length)
– XOR constructor: x ← make xor(m1, . . . ,mj) for j ∈ N and mi ∈ {0, 1}+ for
i := 1, . . . , j.
Parse each parameter as mi = (type,m′i) with type ∈ typeset and m′i ∈ {0, 1}+.
Then if type = xor, let m′′i equal m′i without the right-most nonce len(k) bits, else
m′′i := m
′
i. Let l := max({len(m′′1), . . . , len(m′′j )}) and xi := 0l−len(m
′′
i
)||m′′i for
i = 1, . . . , j. Let r R← {0, 1}nonce len(k) and x := (xor, x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xj || r).
– Type conversion from XOR:m← func conv xor to type(x, l) for x ∈ {0, 1}+ and
l ∈ N.
Parse x as x = (xor, x′ || r) with len(r) = nonce len(k) and let x∗ be the l − tlen
rightmost bits of x′. (When this conversion is called, there will indeed always be
at least l − tlen bits, and the deleted bits on the left will be former zero-paddings
added by the XOR constructor.) Return m := (type, x∗).
– Variable-length nonce constructor: n ← make nonce vl(l) for l ∈ N.
Let n ′ R← {0, 1}l and n := (nonce vl, n′). ✸
The non-functional parts of the commands add length and type tests corresponding
to those in TH, assign new handles where needed, and store new words in a database of
Mu.
8.8 Soundness Theorem
Our security claim is that the Dolev-Yao model with XOR defined in Sections 8.2 to 8.6
is soundly implemented by the realization sketched in Section 8.7 in the sense of BR-
SIM/UC, provided that the surrounding protocol ensures that an XOR is only converted
to another type if the XOR has only one argument, and the type and length of this
argument equal the target type and length of the conversion. We call this precondi-
tion correct XOR conversion, or short CorrXOR. We have already built a restriction to
passive attacks into the definitions of the real and ideal system by only allowing un-
corrupted participants and authentic channels. The soundness proof would still work if
we relaxed the authenticity restriction by allowing message re-ordering, re-routing, and
duplication, i.e., if we solely required that the adversary only sends messages that were
constructed by the correct machines.
To formally capture the property CorrXOR, we need additional notation. The un-
derlying system model from [8] has a well-defined notion of traces that applies to the
combination of our trusted host TH, honest users H, and an ideal adversary A. Essen-
tially, a trace is a sequence of events that occur when the given machines interact. The
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t-th step of a trace r is written rt; we speak of the step at time t. By p?m ∈ rt we mean
that message m is input at port p? in step rt, and rt : D denotes the contents of the term
database D in step rt. The formula in the following definition can be read as follows:
If a term i is converted to type x , and the term really is an XOR, then it is an XOR of
only one argument j, and this argument is of the correct type and length.
Definition 11. (Correct XOR Conversion) A trace r is contained in CorrXOR if and
only if for all t ∈ N, u ∈ H, x ∈ typeset , l ∈ N, and i ∈ INDS , and with ihnd := rt :
D[i].hndu, we have
inu?conv xor to x (i
hnd, l) ∈ rt ∧ rt : D[i].type = xor
⇒ ∃j ∈ INDS : (rt : D[i].arg = (j)
∧ rt : D[j].type = x ∧ rt : D[j].len = l).
✸
We finally define the notion of blackbox reactive simulatability restricted to those
users that guarantee the property CorrXOR (independent of the adversary). We repeat
in the notation that we only consider passive attacks, although this is not a restriction in
the following definition, but built into the systems.
Definition 12. (Reactive Simulatability with Correct XOR Conversion and Passive At-
tacks) A user H uses correct XOR conversion with respect to the machine TH if for all
ideal adversaries A, the property CorrXOR from Definition 11 holds for all possible
traces of the machine set {TH,H,A}. We denote the restriction of blackbox reactive
simulatability for the machine TH to users with correct XOR conversion by ≥CorrXORb,passive .
✸
Let RPar be the set of valid parameter tuples for the real system, consisting of the
number n ∈ N of participants, a collection S of cryptographic schemes (currently con-
taining symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes, signature schemes, and MACs)
that satisfy their respective security definitions against active attacks, see [6, 11, 12],
and length functions and bounds L′. For (n,S, L′) ∈ RPar , let {M1, . . . ,Mn}n,S,L′
be the resulting realization of the Dolev-Yao model. The derivation of suitable length
functions and bounds for the Dolev-Yao model from the real parameters is given by a
function L := R2Ipar(S, L′). This function is extended by the new length functions for
XOR and nonces of variable length. We have nonce vl len(l) := l + tlen. For defining
l := xor len((l1, t1), . . . , (li, ti)), let l′j := lj − nonce len(k) if tj = xor, else l′j := lj .
Then l := max(l′1, . . . , l′i) + nonce len(k). Let {TH}n,L be the Dolev-Yao model with
parameters n and L.
Theorem 3. (Soundness of the Dolev-Yao Model with XOR) For all parameters
(n,S, L′) ∈ RPar and for L := R2Ipar(S, L′), we have
{M1, . . . ,Mn}n,S,L′ ≥
CorrXOR
b,passive {TH}n,L.
✷
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For proving BRSIM soundness for the underlying Dolev-Yao model without XOR, a
simulator Sim was defined in [6] (recall Figure 1) and the required indistinguishability
between the combination of TH and Sim, and the combination of the real machines Mu
was shown. We now show how we extend this simulator to deal with XOR, and we
sketch how to extend the indistinguishability proof.
8.9 Simulator Extensions for XOR and Nonces of Variable Length
Basically Sim translates handles (which represent terms) that it receives from the Dolev-
Yao model TH into real bitstrings as the real adversary expects them and vice versa. In
our case with authentic channels only, there are no messages from the real adversary
(only scheduling signals that designate when existing messages are delivered). Hence
we only need the translation from terms to bitstrings, where we extend the existing
procedure by the treatment of XORs and nonces of variable length, and modify the
treatment of normal nonces.
The state of Sim mainly consists of a database Da that stores the bitstrings the
adversary knows under the adversary handles; these attributes are denoted by hnda and
word (similar to the databases Du in the real machines).
A sent term is indicated by TH to the ideal adversary, and thus here to the simula-
tor, in the form (u, v, a,mhnd), meaning that user u is sending the term corresponding
to handle mhnd to user v over an authentic channel. If Sim already has a bitstring m
for mhnd in Da, i.e., this message is already known to the adversary, then Sim imme-
diately outputs m to A at the corresponding network port netu,v ,a. Otherwise, it first
constructs such a bitstring m with a recursive algorithm id2real(mhnd). This algorithm
decomposes the abstract term using the adversary command adv parse and basic com-
mands. At the same time, id2real builds up a corresponding real bitstring using real
cryptographic operations and enters all subterms and corresponding bitstrings into Da.
Each execution of id2real with an input mhnd starts with a call (type, arg) ←
adv parse(mhnd). If this call yields type = XOR, then either arg = (independent, l)
with l ∈ N or arg = (dependent,B,D, l) where B and D are sets of handles (by
Definition 9) and l ∈ N. In the first case, where the new XOR is linearly independent
from previously known terms, id2real chooses a random bitstring m′ of length l − tlen
and returns m := (xor,m′, r) with r R← {0, 1}n. In the second case, the generic part
of id2real from [6] makes recursive calls to ensure that bitstrings are constructed and
entered in the database Da for all new handles (subterms) in B and D. Recall that B
are the handles of prior XORs and random values such that, when they are XORed to-
gether with the new term designated by mhnd, all random elements of sufficient length
cancel out, and that D contains the handles of all non-random elements and too-short
random values in the resulting XOR. Hence id2real simply XORs all the correspond-
ing bitstrings to obtain the desired, correctly simulated bitstring for the new term: Let
{m1, . . . ,ms} denote the set of strings in Da that correspond to the handles in B ∪ D.
Then m := make xor(m1, . . . ,ms).
If type = nonce vl, we also have arg = (independent, l) or (dependent,B,D, l). In
the first case, id2real chooses a random bitstring m′ of length l− tlen and adds the type
tag as m := (nonce vl,m′). In the second case, it constructs the XOR corresponding
to the linear combination B and the learned values D as for the type xor; let us call this
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result m′ instead of m now. Then it converts this back to a nonce of variable length as
m← func conv xor to nonce vl(m′, l).
For the type nonce, the procedure is similar, except that the random bitstring m′ in
the first case is chosen with the fixed length for these standard nonces.
8.10 Proof of Indistinguishability (Sketch)
The proof of the extended Dolev-Yao model, now including XOR but restricted to pas-
sive attacks, is an add-on to the proof from [6]. The basic structure of this proof is that
a combined system C is defined that essentially contains all aspects of both the real and
the ideal system, and then bisimulations are proved between C and the combination of
the real machines, and between CH and the combination of the trusted host and the sim-
ulator. A bisimulation, however, cannot deal with computational indistinguishability.
Hence at the beginning of the proof, the real asymmetric encryptions were replaced by
simulated ones as made in the simulator. These aspects of the proof remain unchanged
for our inclusion of XOR. It remains to be shown how the bisimulations are extended
for XOR. This is done by considering each input in corresponding states of the three
systems: One shows that it leads to equally distributed outputs in the three systems,
retains certain invariants, and leads to corresponding states again. The essential parts of
these proofs for the different input are the following: For the XOR command, one shows
that the normalization in the ideal system is correct. For the type conversion of XOR,
one shows that the padding and padding removal are consistent. For the construction of
variable-length nonces, only standard technical details need to be shown. (Furthermore,
as in some other operations, the bisimulation can fail here if nonces happen to collide,
but there is a standard error set mechanism by which one shows at the end that this
only happens with negligible probability.) Sending an XOR is the operation where the
correctness of the matrix operations in the ideal system is proved, i.e., essentially that
if the ideal system does not let the ideal adversary learn arguments of an XOR, then the
real adversary obtains no Shannon information from about these arguments. The same
kind of arguments apply to sending a nonce of constant or variable length. Receiving
messages from the network needs no special consideration because of the restriction to
passive attacks.
9 Conclusion and Outlook
We have shown that Dolev-Yao models augmented by XOR, the simplest operation with
algebraic equations in many formal methods and automated tools for cryptographic
protocol proofs, cannot be realized by actual cryptographic libraries in a way that is
at the same time natural, secure, and usable without restrictions. Our first result shows
that typical Dolev-Yao models with XOR are not sound with respect to any secrecy
definition; we only assume that the Dolev-Yao model contains at least a payload type
and allows XORs of payloads.
The intuitive goal of our more complex results is to show that no Dolev-Yao model
with the usual cryptographic operations and XOR can be securely implemented in the
sense of BRSIM/UC, i.e., in the sense that the realization can be safely plugged in for
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the abstraction in arbitrary environments and if arbitrary security goals may be required.
As there was no prior formal definition of what is and isn’t a Dolev-Yao model, we have
approached this intuitive goal by a set of concrete impossibility results under different
precise assumptions about Dolev-Yao models and about the implementation of XORs.
On the positive side, we presented a Dolev-Yao model with XOR that has a cryp-
tographic realization secure against passive attacks if the surrounding protocol addi-
tionally guarantees that no incorrect conversion of XORs back into other types are at-
tempted. Except for the restrictions to passive attacks and correct type conversions, this
result is strong: It uses a BRSIM/UC-style definition, allows a broad range of other
operations in the Dolev-Yao model, and correctly handles situations where some com-
ponents in an XOR are uniformly random and others are not.
As future work, we expect that there are possibilities for positive results also un-
der active attacks by strong restrictions on the protocol class or the security properties
required, and when the Dolev-Yao model is extended compared with typical ones at
least as in our passive result. However, we believe that our impossibility results pose
severe limits on the applicability of formal methods for XOR and cryptography when
ultimately a cryptographically sound implementation is desired. The results certainly
also prove that one cannot simply add operations with algebraic properties to a Dolev-
Yao model if one aims at general secure realizations, even if the operation on its own
seems simple and well characterized by its algebraic properties, as XOR is. We actually
believe that the difficulties we had with XOR are not an exception, but the norm. How-
ever, this remains future work, except that the results trivially generalize to the Abelian
groups Z2l , into which bitstrings can be bijectively mapped.
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